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Jefferson and the Background of the Louisiana Purchase* Thomas Jeff¬
erson played a great part in helping to secure for his country its first
and greatest territorial acquisition. Through his untiring interest in
this effort, he rendered a noble service to the posterity of the nation.
Jefferson had much respect for the "Supreme Law of the Land," and
he engaged in several controversies in trying to ward off measures which
he felt would weaken its supremacy. Nevertheless, in 1803, Jefferson was
confronted with carrying out the act of acquiring the Louisiana territory.
This was an act which he thought the Constitution did not give him the
power to do. He had taken his stand on the "strict construction" inter¬
pretation of the Constitution, and was now faced with a decision which
1
would guarantee doubling America's territory. After writing to his
friends and receiving wise counseling about the matter, Jefferson author¬
ized the purchase. Although he was reluctant to do so, he was strengthened
largely by the consideration that his use of power in this case was for
the welfare of the nation.
The real history of the acquisition of Louisiana must tell of the
westward movement and the desire of the Westerners to obtain the right
to navigate the mouth of the Mississippi River, It should be remembered
that, though Jefferson was the most ardent champion of our rights and in¬
terests in the West, the winning of Louisiana was due to no one man, but
to all who had interest in the valleys of the Tennessee, Cumberland, Ohio,
and Mississippi.
^Adrienne Koch and William Peden, The Life and Selected Writings of
Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1944), p. xxxvl.
1
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TNhen peace ms made with Great Britain in 1783, the frontiersmen had
spread westmrd, in groups, almost to the liississippi, and they had in-
2
creased in number to some twenty-five thousand persons. As they moved
westmrd, they encountered warfare with the Indians who were trying to
protect their tribal territories, but the frontiersmen were able to sub¬
due the obstacles. The wide mnderings of Daniel Boone and his fellow
hunters made the country known, and awakened in the minds of the frontiers¬
men a keen desire to possess it.
It ms important for the frontiersmen to gain from the Spaniards the
free navigation of the Mississippi River, a right which they regarded as
indispensable if they were to attain their proper prosperity and impor¬
tance among the other settlers, Spain had gained control of the mouth
of the Mississippi River when France ceded to her the Louisiana Territory
in 1763,. Hence, the question would the Westerners gain free navigation
of the Mississippi River, had to be decided between the governments of
Spain and the United States. In this case, the frontiersmen depended
upon the government of the United States to win for them their right to
navigate the River,
The frontiersmen were farmers who lived on the clearings made by
their own hands. In addition to their farm work, the frontiersmen en¬
gaged in trade. The farmers and merchants depended upon the outlet of
New Orleans for their shipping. The seaport of New Orleans ms located
at the mouth of the Mississippi. Land transportation was very difficult.
The wateiT/ays were consequently of very great importance, and the fron¬
tiersmen were determined to acquire the control of the whole river from
2
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West (New York, 1929), II, 3.
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the source to the mouth. Therefore, it is easy to argue that the Ameri¬
cans would have won Louisiana in any event, even if the Louisiana Treaty
3
had not been concluded.
Jefferson was greatly distvirbed when he heard the news that Spain by
the secret treaty of San Ildefonso (1800) had transferred to France its
right to the IJississippi and the land constituting the province of Louis¬
iana. Fully aware of the strategic importance of the province, Jefferson
felt that Louisiana in the strong hands of France placed a great obstacle
in the path of American growth and posterity. It was essential that Am¬
erica acquire the territory either through peaceful negotiation or by war.
The final course followed was through peaceful negotiation.
It was no argviment of Jefferson's or of the American diplomats, but it was
the inevitable trend of events, that forced the French dictator Napoleon
Bonaparte to initiate the purchase of Louisiana by offering to sell it to
4
the United States, The full story of the purchase of Louisiana and the
constitutional questions involved will be discussed in detail.
Some knowledge of the influences which shaped Jefferson's early life
may help towards an understanding of his attitude towards the acquisition
of Louisiana and the problem of free navigation of the Mississippi which
5
the western settlers faced, Jefferson was born April 13, 1743, in a Vir¬
ginia farm house among the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains, He was
of yeoman ancestry on his father's side, but of aristocratic lineage on his
mother's. His father, who was prominent among colonial surveyors, knew
3
Roosevelt, op, cit., II, 467,
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l&izzey, Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1918), p, 230,
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H. Addington Bruce, "Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase,"
Outlook, LXXXVIII (February, 1908), 433,
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well all the Alleghany regions south of Pennsylvania.
Born and bred a gentleman farmer, and possessed of a fine estate, he
cared very little for urban life and activities, and, living in the rela¬
tively democratic region, he shared his region's opposition to the more
7
sophisticated aristocracy. He thus represented a distinct class interest,
that of the West against the East; of the agricultioral against industrial
occupations.^
There were ties that held Jefferson in the East. At the age of seven¬
teen, he left home to go to Williamsburg to begin the education that would
fit him for his career. After two years of earnest effort, he graduated
from Tifilliam and Mary College and began the study of law. Here at the seat
of the provincial government he was able to view history in the making and
politics in practice. His chief intellectual stimulus while a student
came from his association with Dr. William Small, professor of philosophy,
and George Wythe, a professor of law. In 1767, he was admitted to the bar,
and later became a member of -Uie Virginia House of Burgesses, thus fairly
g
launched on his political career.
In 1775, when disorder arose in New England over the closing of the
port of Boston, it was Jefferson who took the lead in the Virginia House
of Burgesses on this subject, climaxing his efforts with the famous work
entitled "A Summary View of the Rights of British America," The signifi¬
cance of this writing is shown by the influence it exerted on the political
0
L. F. Abbott, "Thomas Jefferson," Outlook, CXL III (May, 1926), 189,
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mind of America during its struggle for independence.
Jefferson had considerable foresight of the problems of the West and
an appreciation of its future. In the same year that he wrote the Declar¬
ation of Independence, he expressed his belief that there would be con¬
stant demand from the West for free land. He was a champion of the system
by which a settler acquired title to land without any payment to the gov¬
ernment. He made the following statement:
... the people who will migrate to the West. . . will
be a people little able to pay taxes. . , By selling the
lands to them, you will disgust them, and cause sin avulsion
of them from the common Union. They will settle the lands
in spite of eve^body. . . I am at the same time clear that
... lands^ should be appropriated in small quantities.^®
There is vital need to recall an event which occurred in 1777 when
Jefferson was a Virginian legislator. The event was the arrival in Virgin¬
ia of George Rogers Clark, eager to secure authorization for the daring
project of seizing the British posts on the northwest frontier, and thus
eliminating the tide of Indian invasion that threatened to overwhelm the
11
border settlement. He came to Virginia because Virginia laid claim to
all the territory stretching westward from her southern boundary to the
Mississippi, and northward to the Great Lakes. Jefferson became seriously
interested in the romantic adventures of Clark and others who were striving
with him to obtain mastery of the wilderness.
Clark had finally established himself at Kaskaskia and Vincennes in
the spring of 1779. His successful campaigis which gave the Americans a
foothold north of the Ohio were of the utmost importance to Kentucky. Un¬
til this time, the Kentucky settlers had been literally fighting for life
^^Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, The Public Domain, 1776-1936
(Princeton, 1942), p. ZO",
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and home. The successful outcome of Clark’s expedition temporarily
checked the activities of the Indians against the Americans. The confi¬
dence of the backwoodsmen in their ovm triumph was likewise very much in¬
creased.
TfVhat the western settlers needed at the moment was not "wild land,"
but an outlet to market the products yielded by the land iflJiich was already
in their possession. Although the ownership of the mouth of the river was
a matter of immediate importance, the aim of the westerners was to get
possession of it without resorting to warfare.
Jefferson became Governor of Virginia in June 1779. The Revolution¬
ary War, which was going on during his governorship, brought him a wider
understanding of the temper and aspirations of the transmontahe settlers.
The surroundings in which he had spent his childhood and early youth and
the characteristics acquired from his father had laid a foundation for
such an understanding.
In 1781 Jefferson went into retirement. Home at Monticello, he kept
a close watch on the trend of events. He wrote careful replies to a series
f
of questions about Virginia addressed to him by Barbe-Marbois, Secretary of
the French Legation at Philadelphia, The careful observations Jefferson
had been making for years about the surrounding country were revised dur¬
ing the winter of 1782, but were not immediately published in this coun-
13
try, largely for financial reasons. One of these notes was written in
answer to an inquiry in 1781 about the rivers of Virginia. It is inter¬
esting to read his response with reference to the river which has claimed
12
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.importance in this study* i
The Mississippi -will be one of the principal channels
of future commerce for the country westvmrd of the Alle¬
ghany. From the mouth of this river to where it receives
the Ohio, is one thousand miles of water, but only five
hundred by land, passing through the Chickasaw country.
From the mouth of the Ohio to that of the Missouri, is two
himdred and thirty miles by water, and one hundred and
forty by land, from thence to the mouth of the Illinois
river, is about twenty-five miles. The Mississippi. . .
carries fifteen feet of water to the mouth of the Ohio to
which place it is from one mile to a mile and a quarter
wide. Its current is so rapid, that it never can be
stemmed by the force of the wind alone, acting on sails.
Any vessel, however, navigated with oars may come up at
any time and receive much aid from the wind. • • During
its floods, which are periodical as those of the Nile,
the largest vessels may pass down it, if their steerage
can be insured. These floods begin in April, and the
river returns into its banks early in August.
One can readily \inderstand why Jefferson, having a fairly good knowl¬
edge about the Mississippi, was very much interested in gaining free navi¬
gation of the river.
On May 7, 1784, Jefferson was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary of
the United States to assist Benjamin Franklin and John Adams in Europe in
15
arranging commercial agreements.
After Jefferson had begun his treaty framing mission abroad, he la¬
bored to bring about an adjustment of the complications -wdiich had devel¬
oped in the Southwest owing to the evident intention of Spain to close the
navigation of the Mississippi, the one commercial highway affording the
pioneers of Kentucky and Tennessee ready access to the markets of the
East.
Spain was not willing to permit the Westerners free use of the river,




Muzzey, op. cit., pp. 101-102,
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and join the Spanish province. It was this shortsighted policy that gave
rise to the agitation which finally resulted in the Louisiana Purchase;
and long before the Purchase was thought of, it was the same policy that
started dreams of expansion in the mind of the nationalistic Jefferson.
CHAPTER II
LOUISIANA UNDER SPAIN'S DOMINION
The Cession of Louisiana to Spain* The name Louisiana was original¬
ly applied to a vast region of eui unknown extent back of the Alleghany
16
Mountains, and along the Mississippi River and its tributaries. The
Louisiana Territory, it must be remembered, had originally belonged to
France. Basing her claim on the explorations of LaSalle, vdio in 1683
christened the country in honor of Louis XIV, and the adventurers who
came after LaSalle, she had until the French and Indian War exercised
dominion over the fertile lands stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to
her CanadiaJi possessions, and from the Appalachian to the Rooky Mo^Intains.
Never had she become reconciled to the loss she sustained when she turned
her territories over in part to England as a result of conquest and in
part to Spain, by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, as the price of a Spanish
Alliance. By this treaty, Spain gained the Louisiana Territory and com-
17
plete control of the mouth of the Mississippi River.
When Louisiana was ceded to Spain, most of the French Creoles who
formed its population were clustered together in the delta of the Miss-
1 8
issippi. A strong Spanish garrison held New Orleans where the Creoles,
discontented with their new masters, had once risen in a revolt that
19
was speedily crushed. Small garrifeons werf also placed in the different
villages.
^®A. P. Whittaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803 (New York,
1934), p. 260.
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Spain Seeks Means to Develop Her Interests in Louisiana. The English
Colonies had little to do with either Florida or Louisiajia until after the
20
close of the Revolutionary War in 1781. During the peace negotiations,
the United States had demanded the territory north to the Great Lakes,
west to the Mississippi, and south to Florida, together with the right to
navigate the Mississippi, Spain, conducting independent negotiations with
Britain, sought Florida and the land south of the Ohio River and west from
the mountains to the Mississippi, hoping thus to gain complete control of
the great river and of the Gulf of Mexico.
21
On September 3, 1783, the Treaty of Paris was signed. Spain re¬
covered from England Minorca and Florida, the territories which she had
lost to England as a result of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. To the United
States went the territory north to the Great Lakes, west to the Mississippi
River, and south to Florida.
Spain was in no way obligated to the United States by the Peace of
Paris, 1783. She sought means to accomplish her own purposes east of the
Mississippi. But Spain did not have adequate sources of supply and facil-
22
ities for trade. She had to rely upon British goods and British trad¬
ing companies in Florida. Although she had the sea power to close the
Gulf Coast to the United States, she could not close it to Britain. But
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Don Diego de Gardoqui, the first Spanish Minister to the United
States, came in 1785 to negotiate with John Jay, the Seepetary of Congress
who, as early as 1780, was laboring to secure free use of the Mississippi?^
Jay's mission was interrupted by the peace conference at Paris in 1782,and
he was not able to resume diplomatic negotiations until the arrival of Gar-
doqui in 1785.
In his conversation with the Spanish representative. Jay was com¬
pelled to bear in mind the Eastern desire for a commercial treaty which
would admit Iximber, whale qil, naval stores, and other products into the
Spanish ports, bringing in return the needed specie into the United States.
Such a treaty would also influence France, Portugal, and the Mediterranean
powers to make favorable terms for our shipping. After endless bargaining
with Gardoqui, Jay negotiated a compromise treaty on August 3, 1786, by
which Spain was to make certain concessions to our Atlantic trade, but to
keep the Mississippi closed to American boats for twenty-five years,
He argued that such a commercial treaty with Spain at this time was of
more importance, in respect to both politics and commerce, than any the
United States had made or could make with any other nation. Although Jay
knew the importance of the Mississippi River to the Westerners, he did not
think that it was so important at that time. Neither did he feel that this
right could be obtained unless the states fought for it.
The West was in an uproar. While some larged a military expedition to
drive the Spanish from New Orleans, others thought of the benefits they
^^Arthur Burr Darling, Our Rising Empire, 1763-1803 (New Haven, 1940),
pp, 35-41,
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could enjoy under the Spanish flag. Loyal as the men of the West were
to the Union, the prospect of being condemned to the many years of econom¬
ic difficulties for the benefit of the merchants of the Eastern States
was enough to strain their allegiance. Fortunately, the treaty failed
of ratification by the requisite number of nine states.
Jefferson’s Interest in the Free Navigation of the Mississippi River.
In 1786, Jefferson was in Paris serving as Minister Plenipotentiary of the
United States. Being away from his country had no great effect on his in¬
terest in the West. He was informed by political friends at home on the
movements that threatened his dream of expansion. On January 25, 1786,
Jefferson wrote to Archibald Stuart, an influential Virginiain who became
a legislator and jurist. For years he led the conservative wing of Jef-
26
fersonian democrats in Virginia. Jefferson's letter reads:
... I fear from an expression in your letter that the
people of Kentucky think of separating not only from Virgin-
• ia (in which they are right), but also from the Confederacy.
I should think that it would be a most calamitous event and
such a one as every good citizen on both sides should set
.himself against. Our present federal limits are not too
large for good government, nor will the increase of votes in
Congress produce any ill effect. On the contrary, it will
drown the little divisions at present existing there. Our
Confederacy must be viewed as the nest from which all Ameri¬
ca, North and South, is to be peopled. We should take care,
too, not to think it for. . . /ovF/ interest. . . to press
too soon on the ^aniards. Those coxmtries e. Louisiana
and West Florida^annot be in better hands. My fear is,
that they are too feeble to hold them till our population
can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them, piece by
piece. The navigation of the Mississippi we must have. This
is all we are, as yet, ready to receive.
Stuart, seemingly, had called his attention to the growing spirit of
25
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anger and unrest that was taking possession of the Westerners in conse~
quenoe of the Government's failure to arrive at an understanding with
Spain.
In the summer of 1787, there rose to public prominence in the western
country a man of great influence. His name was James Wilkinson. Wilkin¬
son persuaded the SpaJiiards to give him money for using his influence to
separate the West from the Union, which was one of the chief objects of
28
Spanish diplomacy. He continued his exclusive commercial privileges
for some time. His practices gave an impetus to the separatist movement
in Kentucky.
John Brown, the Kentucky delegate to the Confederation Congress, en-
ooviraged much of the spirit of unrest in Kentucky. On July 10, 1788, he
wrote a letter to Harry Innes, the attorney general of Kentucky. His let¬
ter read in part as follows:
... In private conferences which I have had with Ifr.
Gardoqui, the Spanish Minister, I have been assured by him
in the most explicit terms that if Kentucky will declare
her independence and empower some proper person to negotiate
with him, that he has authority and will engage to open the
navigation of the Mississippi for the exportation of their
produce on terms of mutual advantages. But this privilege
never can be extended to them while part of the United
States. . . I have thought proper to communicate /this/ to
a few confidential friends in this district, with his per¬
mission, not doubting but that they will make a prudent
use of the information.^®
When Jefferson, in Paris, heard about Brown's letter, he was greatly
alarmed. Counseling a reasonable degree of moderation and patience to the
Robertson, op. cit., p. 21.
29
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14
Kentuckians, Jefferson wrote to Brown, August 26, 1788*
I should think it proper for the western country to defer
pushing their right to that navigation to extremity; as long
as they can do without it tolerably; but that the moment it
becomes absolutely necessary, it will become the duty of the
Maritime States to push it to every extremity, to which they
would have their own right of navigating the Chesapeake, the
Delaware, the Hudson, or any other water, A time of peace
will not be the surest for obtaining this object. Those
therefore, who have influence in the new country would act
wisely to endeavor to keep things quiet till the western parts
of Europe shall be engaged in war,30
Perhaps Jefferson also had in view the maintenance of the status quo
vmtil the United States would be strong enough to begin the plan of gain¬
ing Louisiana and West Florida as was implied in his letter to Stuart,
With the establishment of the new national government in 1789 under
31
President Washington, the agitation among the disunionists was dropped.
However, the traders demanded impatiently that the United States govern¬
ment take control of the Mississippi River as well as the regions along
both sides of it, for only in that way could the settlers feel sure of a
market for their goods,
Washington recognized that the Mississippi was a most important line
of trade and that New Orleans was its most important market.
During the early summer days in 1789, while Jefferson was still in
his mission in Paris, Washington was busy forming his first cabinet, Jef¬
ferson was Washington’s choice for the important post of Secretary of
State,
^^Henry A, Washington (ed,). The Writings of Jefferson (Philadelphia,
1871), I, 545,
31
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Washington's appointment of Jefferson as Secretary of State was a se¬
lection of greatest consequence to the controversy over the navigation of
the llississippi River, Jefferson immediately focussed his attention up¬
on the Spanish problem in his determination to gain navigation privileges
for the westerners. In 1790, he first introduced the subject to the Span¬
ish officials at New Orleans by seeking to offer the prospect of a mutual
33trade in return for free admission to the Gulf of Mexico, He promised
that the increasing number of settlers would produce valuable commerce for
Spain and eniunerated fully the necessities which could best be furnished
the settlers by Spanish New Orleans. Needless to say, the Spanish govern¬
ment did not adopt Jefferson's proposition.
If Jefferson was guilty of the lack of courage in dealing with the
foreign power, he could not escape the steady pressure of the ViTesterners,
In fact the very existence of the western farmers and merchants depended
heavily upon the unhampered navigation of the Mississippi. Dovra the river
to New Orleans they floated their tobacco, corn, hemp, wheat and limber
for shipment to the towns on the eastern seaboard or the markets of foreign
countries. Therefore, the frontiersmen were compelled to keep open the
port of New Orleans for their economic subsistence.
The years 1791 and 1792 brought equally forceful and unsuccessful ef¬
forts to secure a final acknowledgement of our rights to navigate the liiss-
issippi. The most interesting development of these two years was Jeffer¬
son's composition of a state paper enimerating in full the American claims
32
W, E. Hemphill, "Jefferson's Background of the Louisiana Purchase,"
rJississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (September, 1935), 127-150.
33
Muzzey, op, cit., p. 148.
16
to rights upon the Mississippi. The paper, written March 18, 1792, statesi
... Our right is built on the law of nature and nations.
If we appeal to this, as we feel it written on the heart of man,
what sentiment is written in deeper character than that the
ocean is free to all men, and their ^T. e. the men’s^ rivers to
all their inhabitants? Is there a man, savage or civilized, un¬
biased by habit, who does not feel and attest this truth? Ac¬
cordingly, in all tracts of country united under the same polit¬
ical society, we find this natural right universally acknowledged
and protected by laying the navigable rivers open to all their
inhabitants. . . The real interest then of all the inhabitants,
upper and lower, concur in fact with their rights.
Jefferson had no doubt that the United States would favor war. Think¬
ing of another way of settling the problem, he suggested to William Carmi¬
chael, the American representative at Madrid, to propose to the Spanish
government not simply a treaty securing the desired privilege of naviga¬
tion, but a treaty whereby Spain would cede to the United States all her
territory on the east side of the Mississippi, on condition that we guar-
36
antee all her possession on the western waters of that river. The Span¬
ish Government did not accept this proposal.
Negotiations continued after Jefferson resigned in 1794 as Secretary
of State. It was 1795 when a new turn of affairs in Europe promised a real
chance of success. Jefferson was asked to go to Madrid as a special envoy.
When he declined, Washington appointed Thomas Pinckney to take the posi¬
tion. Pinckney hastened across the Atlanta to conclude a treaty whose two
most important provisions were the settlement of the southern boundary on
the lines claimed by the United States and the granting of the right of de-
•2^
posit to the Westerners. The boundary followed the Mississippi southward
^^Kooh and Peden, op. cit., pp. 316-317.
36
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to the thirty-first parallel, along iiriiich it proceeded eastward to the
Chattahoochee River and down that river to its junction with the Flint
River, then straight to the head of St. Mary's River, and along the St.
Mary's to the Atlantic Ocean. The Spanish troops were to be withdrawn
from this territory within the space of six months. The Westerners were
granted for three years the right of deposit at New Orleans; after three
years, either the right was to be continued or another equivalent port
of deposit was to be granted somewhere on the banks of the Mississippi,
The right of deposit carried with it the right to export goods from the
37
place of deposit free from an inconsiderable duty. This agreement,
known as the Treaty of San Lorenzo, 1795, is referred to as the Pinck-
38
ney Treaty.
In 1798, the Spaniards withdrew from the territory, their course
being due to the fear and worry caused by the unceasing pressure of the
Americans. The territory evacuated was organized as the Mississippi
Territory in June, 1798.
Despite Jefferson's absence from administrative position in 1795,
it was in a very true sense his policy which secured the long delayed
concessions embodied in the Pinckney Treaty, and much of the credit for
this success is rightfully his. It represented his first great triumph
as an ardent champion of our rights and interests in the West as well as
the results of the unceasing pressure of the American frontiersmen.
^"^Ibid.
^®Miller, op. oit., I, 318,
39
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CHAPTER III
JEFFERSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SPAIN'S RETROCESSION
OF LOUISIANA TO FRANCE
The Treaty of San Ildefonso, 1800. For some time following France's
cession of Louisiana to Spain, she was obliged to put aside all thoughts
of re-establishing her sovereignty overseas because she was weakened by
internal dissensions that culminated in the French Revolution of 1789.
France was never content with the Spanish ownership of Louisiana, Jef¬
ferson had been aware of this attitude when, in 1793, Edmond Genet, emis¬
sary from the French Republic to the United States, tried to undertake an
expedition for the conquest of St, Louis and Upper Louisiana,Genet ex¬
pected much of Jefferson in the way of official sympathy and was quite
disillusioned when Jefferson, who was then Secretary of State, became too
well acquainted with his plans and turned against him.
From the end of 1799, France, under the First Consul Bonaparte was
41
the mightiest nation in Europe. Bonaparte's genius was always striving
after more than merely Europesui empire. In 1800, his ambition was plan¬
ning for France the re-establishment in America of the colonial empire
which she had lost to England and Spain. Quietly and quickly, Bonaparte
went to work. He succeeded in persuading King Charles of Spain to cede
42
Louisiana to the French, by the treaty of San Ildefonso, concluded in
October, 1800, The French Republic agreed to elevate King Charles' son-
in-law, the Duke of Parma, to the throne of Tuscany.
40
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Every effort was made to keep the cession from being made public,
and owing to various political complications the transfer of sovereignty
was not concluded immediately.
All went well with the trading interests of the Mississippi Valley
for four or five years succeeding the Pinckney Treaty of 1795. The
written permission covering the right of deposit expressed in the treaty
with Spain was allowed to lapse; yet no actual limitations hindered the
TiTesterners from using the mouth of the Mississippi River. But the
cession of Louisiana to France by the Treaty of San Ildefonso meant that
the natural gateway of the West was acquired by a pov/er more aggressive
than Spain. Yet France did not attempt immediate occupation, and the
transfer was not even suspected in the United States until eight months
43
later.
In March, 1801, Jefferson had replaced Adams in the presidential
chair, and James Madison succeeded Jefferson as Secretary of State. At
first both men did not know of the actual retrocession of Louisiam to
France. Thus, Jefferson began his administration by anticipating a long
period of intimate relations with Spain and France. In sending instruc¬
tions to ViTilliam Claiborne, Governor of the IiUssissippi Territory,aterri-
tory of importance because of its relation with the Spanish authority at
New Orleans, President Jefferson on July 13, 1801, wrote privately;
With respect to Spain our dispositions are sincerely
amiable and even affectionate. We consider her possess¬
ion of the adjacent country as most favorable to our in¬
terests, and should see, with extreme pain any other na¬
tion substituted for them. . . . Should France get poss¬
ession of that co\mtry, it will be more to be lamented
than remedied by us, as it will furnish ground for pro¬
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Rumors had reached Jefferson that Spain was willing to sell or had
sold Louisiana to France* Knowing almost nothing of Bonaparte's schemes,
the suspicious Jefferson on May 26, 1801, wrote a letter to James Monroe,
Governor of Virginia* "There is considerable reason to apprehend that
Spain is to cede Louisiana and the Floridas to France, It is a policy
very unwise in both, and very ominous to us. . Two days later,
Madison wrote to Monroe that intelligence had come through several chan¬
nels T/hich made it probable that Louisiana had been ceded to France.^®
Jefferson was not a warlike president. But his party, the Democrat¬
ic-Republican, was strongest in those parts of the country where the
mouth of the Mississippi was thought to be rightfully the property of the
United States, and Jefferson could not think of resisting the strong pres-
siire of public opinion. The South united with the West in demanding that
France should not be allowed to establish herself on the lower Mississippi
Jefferson realized that for the French to take Louisiana meant war with
the United States sooner or later. He wished peace above all things
else, and made every effort to secure the territory of Louisiana without
appealing to arms.
The Appointment of Robert R. Livingston to the Diplomatic Post at
47
Paris, On account of the quasi-war vd.th Freinoe in 1799-1800, the Uni-
48
ted States were not represented at Paris in 1800, at the time of the
retrocession of Louisiana to France. The President, even before his inaug
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uratioHj had offered the diplomatic post in Paris to Robert R. Living¬
ston, vjho agreed to accept the offer. The new minister was a prominent
member of a great New York family, a member of the committee which had
drafted the Declaration of Iijdependence, and a former Chancellor of the
state of New York.
The importance of Louisiana compelled Jefferson and Madison to
urge Livingston ditring the latter part of September, 1801, to take up
his duties in Paris. Madison wrote his instructions.^^ These pertained
wholly to Louisiana and the Floridas. If a treaty of cession had not
been made, he was to seek to prevent it. If the cession had taken
place, he was to say nothing that would unnecessarily irritate the
French. The freedom of the navigation of the lower Mississippi was
desired. Livingston was to discover upon what terms France would cede
the Island of New Orleans and the provinces of East and West Florida to
50
the United States.
Livingston reached France about November 10, 1801. He felt certain
that Louisiana and the Floridas had been bought by France, and went to
Talleyrand, the French Foreign Minister, with inquiries. Talleyrand de¬
nied the fact. Later, Rufus King, the United States minister at London,
sent a copy of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, which contained the details
51
of the retrocession. Jefferson, after being informed of Talleyrand's
denial, felt certain that the conduct of the French Foreign Minister was
deceitful.
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As a step in the execution of his plan of rebuilding a French coloni¬
al empire in America, Bonaparte sent his able brother-in-law. General Le-
clerc, with a large force to subdue the Island of Santo Domingo as a fu-
ture naval base for the protection of Louisiana* Leolerc and his large
force failed to conquer the Negro republic because of the resistance of
the Negro chieftain, Toussaint I'Ouverture, and the deadly disease of yel¬
low fever on the Island. Failing to accomplish his aim, Bonaparte was
confused as to how he would succeed against the power of the American
people.
There was a friendly conspiracy on the part of a group of Frenchmen
53
to get Bonaparte to give up his projected occupation of Louisiana. A
prominent member of this group was the well known French statesman, Pierre
Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, who arrived with his family at Newport, Rhode
54
Island, on January 1, 1800. He was a refugee from the French Revolu¬
tion. llVhile in America he had considerable interest in political affairs.
In the spring of 1802, Du Pont de Nemours returned to France for a
55
visit planned to last at least six months. Jefferson entrusted him with
letters for Livingston on the Louisiana affair, which he requested DuPont
to read, and after reading, to seal, Jefferson’s object was thus explained
^^Roosevelt, op. cit., II, 476-477,
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I wish you to be possessed of the subject, because
you may be able to impress on the government of France
the inevitable consequences of their taking possession
of Louisismaj ... You, knov^too how much I value peace,
and how unwillingly I should see any event take place
which would render war a necessary resource^ ... That
it may yet be avoided is my sincere prayer; and if you
can be the means of informing the wisdom of Bonaparte
of all consequences, you have deserved well of both
countries. . . ^6
This idea was still more strongly expressed in the enclosure to
Livingston, which DuPont was to read, in order that he might communi¬
cate its interpretation to Bonaparte;
The cession of Louisiarm and the Floridas ^he Am¬
erican minister at Paris had mistakenly informed his gov¬
ernment that the Floridas were included in the treaty of
retrocessior^ by Spain to France works most sorely on
the United States. ... There is on the globe one spot,
the possessor of which is our natural and habitual ene¬
my. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of
three-eighths of our territory must pass to market, and
from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half
of our whole produce and contain more than half our in¬
habitants. France placing herself in that door assumes
to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained
it quietly for years. Her pacific disposition, her feeble
state, would induce her to increase our facilities there
so that her possession of the place would be hardly felt
by us, and it would not perhaps be very long before some
circumstance might arise which might make the cession of
it to us the price of something of more worth to her. Not
so can it ever be in the hands of France. The impetuosi¬
ty of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her char¬
acter, placed in a point of eternal friction with us, and
our character, which though quiet and peace loving. . .
is enterprising and energetic as any nation on earth;
these circumstances render it impossible that France and
the United States can continue long friends when they meet
in so irritable a position. They, as well as we, must be
blind if they do not see this; and we must be very improv¬
ident if we do not begin to make arrangements on that hy¬
pothesis. The day that France takes possession of
Jefferson to DuPont de Nemours, April 25, 1802 in Washington,
(ed.), op. cit., II, 435,
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New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain
her forever within her low water mark. It seals the
xmion of two countries who in conjunction can main¬
tain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that
moment we must marry our attentions to the British
fleet and nation. We must turn all our attention to
a maritime force for which our resources place us on
very high grounds; eind having formed and cemented to¬
gether a power which may render reinforcement of the
settlements here impossible to France, make the first
cannon, ■vdiich shall be fired in Europe, the signal
for tearing up any settlement she may have made and
for the common purposes of the United British and Am¬
erican nations. Every eye in the United States is
now fixed on this affair of Louisiana. Perhaps noth¬
ing since the Revolutionary War has produced more un¬
easy sensations through the body of the nation.®"^
Here Jefferson found it necessary to abandon one of his most impor¬
tant principles - that of avoiding entangling alliances - in favor of an
alliance with England. Heretofore, he had been anti-English and pro-
French,
Jefferson wished to prevent the occupation of Louisiana by diplo¬
matic means, if possible. Otherwise, he would delay hostilities for a
few years until the western population had increased sufficiently to
provide a powerful amy for the conquest of the French territory.
On July 30, 1802, Livingston wrote the Secretary of State that he
had received his dispatches to him from the President by DuPont de
Nemours, and that he was preparing a report to give to the French gov¬
ernment. The title of the report was "Whether It Will Be Advantageous
CO
to France To Take Possession of Louisiana," Livingston had heard
about Bonaparte's proposed Louisiana exjsedition and thought of this as




'a way of counteracting the occupation. Some twenty copies of his work
I
were distributed among leading members of the government; but this doo-
ment had no effect in weakening Bonaparte's deep interest in possessing
Louisiana. The report was presented early in August, 1802, and on Sep¬
tember 1, Livingston reported; "I yesterday made several propositions to
the minister on the subject of Louisiana. He told me frankly that every
offer was premature; that the French Government had determined to take
possession first, so that you must consider the business as absolutely
59
determined. . . ”
Livingston encountered failure after failure in trying to work
through Talleyrand to prevent the French occupation of Louisiana.
Jefferson refused to approve taking possession of Louisiana by force,
but he never ceased to feel the strong pressure of western public senti¬
ment; and so he continued determined in his purpose to obtain Louisiana,
Spain's Violation of The Treaty of San Lorenzo. Before the Treaty
of San Ildefonso had been consummated, Juan Venture Morales, the Spanish
Intendant of New Orleans, deliberately threw down the gauge of battle to
60
the Westerners. On October 16, 1802, he declared officially that the
American traders had forfeited their right of deposit in New Orleans,
According to the Pinckney Treaty of 1795, that right had been granted
for three years with specific understanding that the period should be
lengthened and if the Spaniards chose to dissolve the permit as far as
^^Livingston to Madison, September 1, 1802, in Lyon, Louisiana
in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804, p. 161,
®*^Roosevelt, op. cit., II, 473.
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the port of Orleans was concerned, they should give the Americans a substi¬
tute establishment elsewhere on the banks of the Mississippi. Apparently,
the Americans had taken for granted that the privilege, when once conferred,
would never be withdrawn; but Morales declared that the right of deposit
had lapsed,
The closing of the port was due to a royal order issued by the King,
62
July 14, 1802. Morales had complained that the Americans were using the
right of deposit as a means of smuggling and avoiding the customary duties,
especially on silver and gold.
The action taken by Morales was agreeable to Bonaparte and Talleyrand,
Perhaps they were pleased that Spain had taken upon herself alone an impor¬
tant step which they felt would be of value to France’s future commercial
plans for the Mississippi Valley, Spain was only a de facto rather than a
de jure neighbor of the United States at this time,
Jefferson was roused to a sense of great crisis which was a menace to
the political security of his administration, his party, and even to the
Union itself, "When the news of the suspension of the right of deposit had
traveled up the Mississippi, a cry of protest swept the western country.
The Federalist?, overjoyed at this sense of outrage on the part of Jefferson's
western supporters, made appeals for immediate war. This was to force Jef¬
ferson to take an ill-considered step or lose the support of the Democrats
63
of Kentucky and Tennessee.
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concerning the Westerners to C. Pinckney, our minister to Spain. ”It is
the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac, and all the navigable rivers of
the Atlantic States, formed into one,”^^ During the year 1802, the farm¬
ers of Kentucky and the Mississippi Territory alone had sent $1,600,000
worth of produce through that channel. The reports of the Spanish custom¬
house showed transhipments of over 1,000 hogsheads of tobacco and 100,000
barrels of flour, with great quantities of bacon, pork, lead, cordage, and
I 65apples. Of the 265 vessels that sailed from the Mississippi the same year,
158 were American, as compared with 104 Spanish and only three French.
The Americans were rapidly gaining a monopoly of the trade of New Orleans.
When the Westerners learned of the closxire of the Mississippi, they made
strong protests to the President and Congress. They were anxious to have
66
the United States troops at Natchez march on New Orleans.
Jefferson was clever in using his wit. Instead of catering to public
opinion, he calmly formulated a policy and carried it through to a most
successful termination. The first thing to do, thought Jefferson, was to
quiet the public mind; the second thing was to regain the right of deposit;
67
the third was to steer an astute course between France and England and
to take advantage of every possible opening to secure possession of New Or¬
leans and the Gulf Coast.
The Spanish Minister, Casa Yrujo, reported to the Spanish government:
The result of the closure of the Mississippi would have
been a declaration of war that would have involved Spain and
perhaps a great part of Europe if by chance there had not been
^^luzzey, op. cit., p. 226.
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at the head of this government a man of the virtue, mod¬
eration, and sane policy of Mr. Jefferson. Even with
these dispositions on his part and his influence over
the Republican Party, I confess to your Excellency that
during last week I was in the greatest anxiety, and you
may rest assured that all the firmness of the dominant
party was necessary to resist the reiterated efforts of
the Federalists not to await the slow reparation that
might follow a negotiation, but to declare war immedi¬
ately and to seize Louisiana and the Floridas. . , I am
convinced that if the proclamation of the Intendant is
not revoked in three months, the clamor ef the Federal¬
ists, the impulse of public opinion and party policy
will force the President and the Republicans to declare
war against their wish.®®
Yrujo was seriously interested in his country not engaging in a war
with the United States.
Jefferson hoped to safeguard American interests by peaceful negoti¬
ations with France if possible; otherwise, as was stated in the letter to
Livingston, April 18, 1802, Jefferson was prepared to attempt to secure
his ends through an alliance with England. He stated no terms under
which he would abandon the claim to the free navigation of the Mississ¬
ippi.
President Jefferson delivered his second annual message to Congress
69
on December 15, 1802. The agitation produced by the violation of the
Pinckney Treaty made it necessary for Jefferson to use to advantage his
patient and tactful diplomacy. He calmed Congress by a confident message
in -wdiich he made mention of the closure of the Mississippi. He talked of
peace and friendship in Europe and the growing prosperity of our country.
TAfhen he came to the question of Louisiana, he said:
, . .The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana
to France will, if carried into effect, make a change of
the late aspect of our foreign relations, which will
Casa Yrujo to Cevallas, Foreign Secretary of Spain, December 3,
1802, in Robertson, op. cit., p. 126.
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doubtless have just weight in any deliberation of
the Legislature connected with that subject. .
Monroe’s Appointment as Special Envoy to Paris. The warlike attitude
taken by the Federalists emphasized to Jefferson and Madison the impor¬
tance of New Orleans. It was the Frenchman, Du Pont de Nemours, who had
suggested to them that possibly France might sell New Orleans and that it
might be cheaper to pay a good price than to fight a war. Jefferson took
action on this suggestion. On January 11, 1803, he referred to Congress
his plan to accredit to France a special embassy with plenipotentiary
powers; it was to consist of Robert R. Livingston, the resident Minister,
71
and James Monroe who was to be sent as Minister Extraordinary.
At the President's suggestion. Congress appropriated |2,000,000 for
his use and the Senate approved the nomination of James Monroe, whose term
as Governor of Yirginia had just expired, as Minister Plenipotentiary and
Extraordinary to France and Spain. The new Minister was to aid Livingston
in buying the Isle of Orleans and perhaps the Floridas, which meant fixing
the Mississippi as the boundary between the French and American possessions.
Monroe was one of Jefferson's intimate friends, but Monroe's intimacy
with Jefferson was not Jefferson's reason for appointing him to the posi¬
tion. Jefferson knew that Monroe had had interest in the navigation of the
Mississippi for some time. Monroe had served in the Confederation Congress
from 1783-1786 and was there distinguished for his vigorous insistence upon
the right of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi River.
'^Qlbid.
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Twice within a month in 1784, Monroe crossed the Alleghenies for the pur¬
pose of becoming acquainted with the actual condition of the western
country. One of the fruits of his western observations was a memoir writ
ten in 1786 to support the rights of the people of the West to the free
73
navigation of the Mississippi.
Livingston did not need Monroe's assistance, for he had already be¬
gun working toward an agreement with the French Foreign Minister, Talley¬
rand, But Jefferson believed that Monroe had won the confidence of the
western people because of the interest which he had already shoivn in the
western problem. His appointment of Monroe was an act to quiet the ViTest
until a peaceful negotiation was made, Jefferson's high opinion of Mon¬





I dropped you a line on the 10th, informing you of
a nomination I had made of you to the Senate. . . The
agitation of the public mind, , , is extreme. . . The
measures we have been pursuing. , , do not satisfy their
minds,
, , . It was essential, then, to send a minister extra¬
ordinary, to be joined with the ordinary one, with dis¬
cretionary powers; first, however, well impressed with
all o\ir views, and therefore qualified to meet and mod¬
ify to these every form of proposition which would come
from the other party, . • You possess the unlimited con¬
fidence of the administration and of the Western people;
. . . .For on the event of this fission depend the fu¬
ture destinies of this Republic,
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Jefferson's policy for a while was to endure complications imtil
war between France and England came. Whether the western states could
be persuaded to endure the pressure of a French army at New Orleans was
doubtful, but Jefferson used authority and political skill in controll¬
ing them.
Monroe accepted his appointment and came for his instructions.
His instructions rested on the authority to negotiate for New Orleans
75
and the Floridas only.
The essential aim of Jefferson's statesmanship lay in the main¬
tenance of peace. Through difficulties, threats, and temptations of
every kind, he held fast to this idea, which is the clue to what seems
inconsistent in his administration. The Federalists cried war, not
peace. But Jefferson was determined that there should be no war. He
waited to hear the result of Monroe's mission to Paris. The transaction




The purchase of Louisiana from France by the United States during
Jefferson's administration ended forever France's dream of controlling
the Mississippi Valley. The acquisition of Louisiana from Spain by
France was part of an ambitious plan by which Bonaparte and his foreign
minister, Talleyrand, had hoped to build a colonial empire in North Am¬
erica, Fortunately for the United States, European conflicts forced
Bonaparte to sell all of Louisiana to the Americans.
The negotiation for the purchase of Louisiana was made by the Ameri¬
can envoys, Robert R. Livingston and James Monroe. Jefferson had instruct¬
ed them to negotiate for only a part of the territory, as will be shown
in their instructions given below. It was a surprise to the American en¬
voys that the offer of the whole colony was me.de to them. This offer was
prompted by considerations of world strategy, the strategy being construct¬
ed by Bonaparte and the French war and navy ministers. It had become ad¬
visable for the French to relinquish all their interests and responsibili¬
ties in the New World in order to concentrate their forces, military and
naval, in Europe and the seas about Europe, Livingston and Monroe thus
found themselves confronted with a far larger offer than they had been
instructed to expect. Livingston notified Madison at once of the new large
offer Bonaparte was making, but he and Monroe did not wait for new instruc¬
tions, They negotiated on their own responsibility with the French gov¬
ernment and a treaty was drawn up and subsequently ratified by both par¬
ties, The United States Government accepted the decision of its envoys
in proceeding to purchase the whole of Louisisina,
32
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Jefferson’s Official Instructions to the American Ministers. Jetfferson
had appointed James Monroe in January, 1803, to go to France as a special
envoy to assist the resident Minister, Robert R. Livingston, in making ne¬
gotiations with the French Government. After many delays, Monroe finally
sailed for France on March 8, 1803, almost two months after his appoint-
76
ment. He bore the official instructions, addressed to himself and Liv¬
ingston, which outlined the following plan as the final opinion of Jeffer-
77
son and Madison.
The envoys were to request France to sell to the United States the
Floridas and the Island of New Orleans for not more than 50,000,000 livres
(about $10,000,000 at par), and to guarantee the free navigation of the
78
Mississippi to citizens of both countries. In return for this the United
States would give to French vessels south of the boundary of 31° equal
privileges with American vessels, with a right of deposit. If necessary,
the United States would guareintee forever the remainder of French Louisi¬
ana on the west bank of the Mississippi. In case only a part of the ter¬
ritory desired could be purchased, the Floridas were to be estimated at
one-half the value of West Florida. If France would not cede the Island
of New Orleans, then the Commissioners were to try to get jurisdiction
over a town on the Mississippi for a place of commercial deposit. If no
cession of the Floridas were possible, they should seek rights of deposit
79
also on the rivers in West Florida.
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James liadison to R. Livingston and J. Monroe, November 9, 1803, in




Should the French Government plan hostilities against the United
States or force a war by closing the Mississippi, then Monroe and Liv¬
ingston were to cross the Channel and invite Great Britain to a treaty
of alliance in vhich the two parties would agree to make no separate
peace or truce. Should France only deny the right of deposit without
otherwise disturbing the navigation of the river, the envoys were to
make no positive engagement but leave it to Congress to decide between
80 'immediate war and further delay.
The instructions were expressions of confidence in Livingston's
and Monroe's discretion. The envoys were to use various means of im¬
pressing upon Bonaparte the kind of argximent -which he heeddd.
Jefferson realized fully the seriousness of the si-fcuation if
France acquiesced in the Spanish government's closing the Mississippi.
He expressed himself clearly to this effect in a letter written to Du
Pont:
•<
Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of no
delay as to our course, and the use of -fche Mississippi so
indispensable that we cannot hesitate one moment to hazard
our existence for its maintenance. If we fail in this ef¬
fort to put it beyond the reach of accident, we see the
destinies -we have to run, and prepare at once for them. . . .
In the same letter, Jefferson added a statement emphasizing the
fact that the United States would no longer tolerate disrespect of its
rights of navigation and deposit. The statement follows:
Not but that we shall still endeavor to go on in
peace and friendship with our neighbors as long as we
can, if our rights of navigation and deposit are re¬
spected; but as we foresee that the caprices of the
local officers and the abuse of those rights by our
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prevent, will keep up a state of irritation which cannot long
be kept inactive, we should be criminally improvident not to
take at once eventual measures for strengthening ourselves
for the contest.
Bonaparte’s Declarations. It was no arguiaent of Jefferson's or of
the American diplomats, but the inevitable trend of events that finally
brought about a change in Bonaparte's mind. The army he sent to Haiti
failed because most of the soldiers died from disease and in combat with
the natives. The Peace of Amiens vdaich France concluded in 1802, after
a decade of war with all the rest of Europe, was being ignored by Eng¬
land and France. England refused to abandon Malta in the Mediterranean
and Bonaparte continued his aggressions on the Republics along the
French borders. Each made the other's acts a cause of war, and both be¬
gan preparations for war.
As the attitude of England grew more hostile, Bonaparte realized
that he could not afford to hamper himself with the difficult defense
of a distant province. Moreover, he needed money in order to carry on
the struggle.
In April, 1803, Bonaparte had no desire to proceed with the fur-
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ther organization and settlement of Louisiana. As Spain was still in
possession of Louisiana, it would have seemed reasonable to have re¬
turned the colony to her, but such an idea did not appeal to Bonaparte.
84
He did not see how he could benefit by returning the colony to her.
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the United States, for in this way he thought it would best aid France
in the renewal of the war with England.
Bonaparte summoned Francois Barb^-Marbois, Minister of the Treas¬
ury, and Jase DecrSs, Minister of the Navy and the Colonies, to a con¬
ference on April 10, 1803, and addressed themj
I am full sensible of the value of Louisiana and it
was my wish to repair the error of the French diplomatists
who abandoned it in 1763. I have scarcely recovered it
before I run the risk of losing itj but if I am obliged to
give it up, it shall hereafter cost more to those to whom
I yield it. The English have dispossessed France of all
her northern possessions in America, and now they desire
those of the South. I am detemined that they shall not
have the Mississippi. Although Louisiana is but a trifle
compared to their vast possessions in other parts of the
globe, yet, judging from the vexation they have manifested
on seeing it return to the power of France, I am certain
that their first object will be to gain possession of it
.... The conquest of Louisiana might be easily made,
and I have not a moment to lose in putting it out of their
reach. ... I am inclined in order to deprive them of all
prospect of ever possessing it, to cede it to the United
States.
... They only asked for one city of Louisiana, but I con¬
sider the whole colony as lost; and I believe that in the
hands of this rising power it will be more useful to the
political, and even the commercial interests of France,
than if I should attempt to retain it. Let me have both of
your opinions on the subject.®^
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Barbe-Marbois fully approved of the cession, but Deeres opposed it.
Bonaparte concluded the conference without making his determination
known. The next day, however, he sent for Barbe-Marbois, and said to
himj "The season for deliberation is over. I have determined to re¬
nounce Louisiana. I shall give up not only New Orleans, but the whole
87
colony without reservation. Bonaparte was a great statesmen, and he
did not need to be told that it would be unwise to try to keep a country
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The Disoretion of the American Ministers in Negotiation. On April
11, 1803, Talleyrand startled Livingston by asking him iwhat the United
States would pay for the whole territory of Louisiana, Livingston re¬
membered the wishes of the United States extended only to New Orleans
and the Floridas, but the question asked him was worth careful consid¬
eration, He did not know what the United States would give for the
whole colony. He felt that the United States would not object to the
cost of the offer,
Livingston reported the offer to Madison and stated that Great Bri-
tain might seize Louisiana before it became French or American,
On April 13, 1803, Livingston gave a dinner in honor of Monroe who
arrived in Paris the day before, Barbe-Iiarbois visited Livingston be-
89
fore Monroe's arrival and conversed with Livingston alone. He relat¬
ed that the news from London indicating that the British were raising
fifty thousand men to take New Orleans had impressed Bonaparte. He
stated further that Bonaparte had announced that he would sell Louisi¬
ana for 100,000,000 francs, with the proviso that the American Govern¬
ment would assvune liability for the claims of its citizens for damages
90
done to their shipping, Barbe-Marbois felt the amount was too large
and wanted to know how much Livingston could offer. Livingston promised
to consider the offer when conferring later with Monroe. Barbe-Marbois
left, pondering the idea in his mind.
88
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Livingston acquainted Monroe with Bonaparte's proposals which Barbe-
Marbois had told him# The two ministers discussed the matter seriously
and awaited another conference with Barbe-lVIarbois.
BarbS-I&rbois met Livingston and Monroe at the latter's lodings on
91
April 27. He produced Bonaparte's proposed treaty and a proposition
of his own which differed primarily from that of the First Consul by re¬
ducing the price of Louisiana from 100,000,000 to 80,000,000 francs. In
the general conversation which followed, Livingston demanded considera¬
tion of the claims of American citizens against the French Government,
Barbe-l/Iarbois suggested that if Livingston would offer 60,000,000 francs
clear of the American claims, which were estimated at 20,000,000 francs,
he would transmit the information to Napoleon. Barbe-Marbois assured
Livingston that, should the United States make the purchase, France
92
would withdraw her claim to the colony entirely, Livingston and Mon¬
roe did not hesitate to accept the bargain.
Highly elated over buying an empire, Livingston wrote a long letter
to Madison, which he closed with these words* "Thus, sir, you see a nego¬
tiation is fairly started and upon grounds which I confess I prefer to
93
all other commercial privileges.”
The Treaty of Cession. At a meeting at Barbe-lilarbois' home, April
30, 1803, the technicalities of the treaty were discussed and settled,
94 *
pending the approval of Bonaparte.
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vague. As stated in the treaty, the United States was to receive--
... the Colony or province of Louisiana, with the
same extent it now has in the hands of Spain, and that
it had when France possessed it; and such as it should
be after the treaties subsequently entered into between
Spain and other states.^®
The American Ministers desired a definition of the boundaries, but
Bonaparte refused. "If an obscurity did not already exist, it would
96
perhaps be good policy to put one there," he told Barb6-Marbois. Bar-
be-Iilarbois disregarded the latter part of Bonaparte's statement. Because
of his explanation, the American Ministers withdrew their demand for a
definition of the boundaries and took the risk that the boundary question
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could be settled later.
The treaty in general provided only for the cession of the colony
98and concessions to the French and Spanish commercial interests.
Financial arrangements of the treaty were considered next. The
convention providing the 60,000,000 francs as the payment for the colony
was concluded. The convention providing 20,000,000 francs to cover the
American claims was not signed until a week later, but all three dociiments
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were dated April 30. One-third of the principal was to be paid in 1819
and the remainder, the two successive years,
In May, 1803, Monroe and Livingston signed the papers vdaich trans-
101
ferred the Province of Louisiana to the United States, Well might
^^Mller, op. Pit., II, 498.
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Livingston exclaim as he rose and shook hands with Monroe and Barbe-
Marboisi
We have lived long, but this is the noblest work
of our vdiole lives. . . .From this day the United States
take their place among the powers of the first rank. The
instruments which we have just signed. . . prepare ages
of happiness for innumerable generations of human crea¬
tures.
Madison in a letter to Livingston stated Jefferson's approval of the
103
action taken by the negotiators, despite the fact that Jeffersen did
not instruct the Ministers to buy the whole colony.
No one had watched over the proceedings by which Louisiana was
purchased with more interest and care, and yet nowhere does Jefferson
claim credit for himself. As between Livingston and Monroe, he estimated
the services of each fairly: "The truth is both have a just portion of
merit, and were it necessary or proper, it could be shown that each has




Hill, "James Madison," loc. cit., p. 27.
104
Bemis, op. cit., p. 37,
CliAPTER V
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN
THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA
Undoubtedly the purchase of Louisiana was one of the most momentous
steps in the history of the United States; it was so in itself for the
sheer material acquisition it brought about. Yet it had a further im¬
portance in the constitutional questions it raised, and the settlement
of these questions was a constructive step in the development of the
United States Constitution. The interpretation of the Constitution was
made by members of Congress when the question of the right to acquire and
govern foreign territory came before them. The writings of the states¬
men concerned and the debates in Congress show the great interest dis¬
played in the problems which arose.
Jefferson's View of the Constitutional Right to Acquire Territory.
Jefferson's expectation of constitutional difficulties which might arise
from the acquisition of territory was strong. One of the first consti¬
tutional questions to be discussed as a result of the purchase of Louis¬
iana \ras whether a constitutional right to acquire territory resided in
the Executive, or indeed in any arm or arms of the Federal Government.
No specific grant of the power to the Federal Government to acquire ter¬
ritory was to be found in the Constitution. Was the power to acquire
territory implied in provisions of the Constitution relating to other
matters? This was a disputed question.
Jefferson's view had been that the Union was merely a compact be¬
tween sovereign states, and that new territory and alien people could
not be added to it without the consent of all the partners. He had been
a staunch defender of states' rights and state sovereignty. In making
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plans for the acceptance of Louisiana, Jefferson felt it necessary to
come to a decision as to the grounds on vhich the new territory was to
be accepted, and to put a plan embodying the decision in the hands of
friends in Congress# He thought that Congress should ask the people for
an amendment to the Constitution, authorizing their receiving the pro¬
vince into the Union, and providing for its government.
The arrival of the treaty of cession on July 14, 1803, and the
short period allowed for ratification, limited to October 30, forced
Jefferson on July 16 to call a special session of Congress to meet Octo-
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ber 17, to deal with the matters claiming the consideration of Congress#
Vilhile waiting for Congress to assemble, Jefferson wrote an amendment
to be proposed by Congress to the states as soon as Congress should meet#
This amendment was submitted to members of his Cabinet for suggestions
or approval# The text was as follows:
The province of Louisiana is. incorporated with the
United States and made part thereof. The right of oc¬
cupancy in the soil, and of self-government, are con¬
firmed to the Indian inhabitants, as they now exist#
Pre-emption only of the portions rightfully occupied by
them and a succession to the occupancy of such as they
may abandon, with the full rights of possession as well
as of property and sovereignty in -sdiatever is not or
shall cease to be so rightfully occupied by them shall
belong to the United States#
The legislature of the Union shall have authority to
exchange the right of occupancy in portions where the
United States have full right for lands possessed by In-
• diEins within the United States on the East side of the
Mississippi# . # #
The legislature shall have no authority to dispose
of the lands of the province otherwise than as herein¬
before permitted, until a new Amendment of the Constitu¬
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The amendment was in harmony with Jefferson's idea of strict con¬
struction of the Constitution, for practically every conceivable idea
was provided for and legislative action was clearly stated. However,
it is doubtful whether Jefferson had given thought to the idea that
the Indian rights defined in the amendment would have become a part of
the Constitution. Had they become so, the Government might have been
in a difficult position, especially if the Indians had become hostile
to the white settlers.
Jefferson expressed his view regarding the Indian question in his
correspondence. He wrote to General Horatio Gates that, "If our legis¬
lature dispose of it (the territory) with the wisdom we have a right to
expect, they may make it the means of tempting all our Indians on the
East side of the Mississippi to remove to the West, and of condensing
107
instead of scattering our population." In the same letter, Jefferson
made hints as to the contemplated government of the territory. He did
not think it should be a separate government, but presumed New Orleans
and the settled portion of Louisiana would be annexed to the Mississippi
Territory. The rest would be shut off from American settlement and left
to the self-government of the natives.
Constitutional difficulties were uppermost in Jefferson's mind. In
a letter to John Breckinridge, a member of the Senate, Jefferson stated
that the Louisiana treaty must be laid before both houses because both
had important functions to exercise respecting it. He added:
... I suppose they must then appeal to the nation
for an additional article to the Constitution approving
nnH confirming an act which the nation had not previous¬
ly authorized. The Constitution has made no provision
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for our holding foreign territory, still less for in¬
corporating foreign nations into our Union, The exec¬
utive, in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so
much advances the good of our country, has done an
act beyond the Constitution,
In his letter above to Breckinridge, Jefferson made it clear that
the authority to purchase territory should derive from the consent of
the nation; and since no authority had been given, an appeal should be
made to the nation to ratify an amendment proposed to that effect by
Congress,
Jefferson sent a letter to Gallatin, Secretary of Treasury, re¬
questing his view of the constitutional right to acquire territory, Gal¬
latin could see no difference between "a power to acquire territory for
the United States and the power to extend by treaty the territory of the
United States,” As an answer to the question whether any constitutional
objection really existed, Gallatin replied*
. ,, To me it would appear, (1) that the United States,
as a nation, have an inherent right to acquire territory;
(2) that whenever that acquisition is by treaty, the same
constituted authorities in whom the treaty-making power is
vested have a constitutional right to sanction the acquisi¬
tion,
Gallatin's statement above shows that he was now ready to interpret
the Constitution broadly to justify the acquisition of Louisiana, He had
previously, during the Federalists' control of Congress, been an advocate
of strict construction.
Jefferson to Breckinridge, August 12, 1803, in Washington, (ed,),
op, cit,, IV, 498-501,
^*^^Gallatin to Jefferson, January 13, 1803, in Henry Adams, (ed,).
The Writings of Albert Gallatin, (Philadelphia, 1897), I, 113,
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The constitutionality of the treaty and of its provisions was a
topic of conversation between Jefferson and his friend Wilson Cary
Nicholas, a senator from Virginia. Nicholas urged him to take a
broad view of the powers granted to the Federal Government under the
Constitution. In a letter to Jefferson, September 3, 1803, Nicholas
gave his view on the subject:
Upon an examination of the Constitution, I find
the power as broad as it could well be made (art. 4,
par. 3), except that new States cannot be formed out
of the old ones without the consent of the State to
be dismembered; and the exception is a proof to my
mind that it was not intended to confine the Congress
in the admission of new States to what was then the
territory of the United States. Nor do I see anything
in the Constitution that limits the treaty-ioaking power,
except the general limitation of the power given to
the government, and the evident object for which the
government was instituted. .
On September 7, 1803, Jefferson made a reply to Nicholas’ letter.
First, he made remarks on the danger of delay and the necessity for rapid
action on the part of Congress; then he turned his attention to the con¬
stitutional questions involved. He stated his belief that Congress did
not*have the power of admitting new states into the Union outside the
territory owned at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Con¬
tinuing he said:
When an instrument admits two constructions, the one
safe, the other dangerous, the one precise, the other in¬
definite, I prefer that which is safe and precise. I had
rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where
it is found necessary, than to assxane it by a construc¬
tion which would make our powers boundless. Our peculiar
security is in the possession of a written constitution.
Let us not make it a blank paper by construction. I say
the same as to the opinion of those who consider the grant
110Quoted in Adams, History,■ I, 87-88
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of the treaty-making power as boundless. If it is,
then we have no constitution. If it has bounds,
they can be no others than the definition of the
powers which that instrument gives. . . I think it
important, in the present case, to set an example
against broad construction, by appealing for new
power to the people,
Jefferson's reply gives clearly his stand on the "strict construc¬
tion" interpretation of the Constitution. It also shows that Jefferson
felt that the way to evade broad construction was by appealing for new
power to the people. But in the same letter Jefferson had something
quite different to say. He said: "If, however, our friends shall think
differently, certainly I acquiesce with satisfaction; confiding, that
the good sense of our country will correct the evil of construction when
112
it shall produce ill effects." It is evident, then, that Jefferson
was prepared to give way ultimately to broad construction.
Jefferson was apparently prepared to acquiesce in broad construction,
for he no longer held out for an amendment to the Constitution. What was
necessary to be done he left to Congress. It seems reasonable to think
that the advice of his friends influenced him. Also Jefferson was aware
of the fact that to wait for a constitutional amendment authorizing the
purchase of Louisiana might have resulted in the loss of the territory so
vital to the future security of the nation. The amendment was not, in
fact, proposed, and an important precedent for future action in regard
to the acquisition of territory was established.
Jefferson Convenes Congress. The treaty of cession had arrived in
the United States from Paris on July 14, 1803, and only a short time was




allowed for its ratification. For the purpose of acting in time on the
treaty. Congress had been called by an executive proclamation to meet
October 17. The House of Representatives as well as the Senate was
called because both were needed to appropriate money to pay for the ter¬
ritory, and make provisions for its government,
Jefferson delivered his message to the Senate and the House of i^ep-
resentatives in a joint session. After announcing the transfer of
Louisiana by France to the United States, he recommended that after the
treaty should receive the constitutional sanction of the Senate, the mat¬
ter should be laid before the House of Representatives, so that measures
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might be taken for the immediate occupation of the territory.
As Jefferson had anticipated, the constitutionality of the purchase
of Louisiana caused considerable debate in both houses of Congress. How¬
ever, the debate took place after the treaty was ratified by the Senate
and sent to the House,
Jefferson, expecting a struggle in the Senate along party lines,
had instructed some of his close friends in the Senate to impress upon
the western Senators the necessity of their presence on the first day of
the session. He knew that every friend of the treaty was needed. He
also instructed them to use their influence in advising the Senators to
postpone their discussion of the constitutional difficulties until after
the ratification of the treaty, Jefferson feared that Bonaparte might
hear about the difficulties involved in the purchase and change his mind.
He feared also that the time limit for the ratification of the treaty
was too short for a lengthy debate.
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The treaty was admitted to the Senate, October 17, 1803, without an
accompanying resolution for a constitutional amendment. The western
Senators and other Republicans who controlled the Senate used their in¬
fluence in such a way that the Senate ratified the treaty on October 19,
114
by a vote of 24-7,
On October 21, 1803, Jefferson submitted a special message on Louis¬
iana to Congress, announcing the exchange of ratifications between the
President and the First Consul of France, He asked Congress to use its
legislative capacity in making provisions for carrying the treaty and
conventions into effect.
As will appear under the topic which follows, the provisions for
carrying the trealy into effect were not made until after the constitu¬
tional questions involved in the purchase of Louisiana had been debated
in both houses of Congress,
The Debate in Congress on the Treaty, As was foreseen by Jefferson
and some of his friends. Congress raised questions of constitutionality
about the making of the treaty. The questions were debated along party
lines and in the interest of the individual states. It can be said
that the debate was somewhat like a contest between the broad and the
strict constructionists of the Constitution, or a contest between the
Federalists and the Republicans,
Most of all, the Federalists feared that in the course of time a
group of agricultural states would be formed from the new territory,
thus upsetting the political balance and causing the industrial and
ll^Everett S, Brown, The Constitutional History of the Louisiana
Purchase 1803-1812 (Berkeley, 1920), p, 39, “
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commercial East to be outvoted in Congress. The Republicans gave strong
arguments in the defense of Jefferson's administration. Those from the
West had an interest in its future development. Personalities in the
two houses were as followsi
In the Senate sat John Breckinridge, a Democrat of Kentucky. From
Virginia came John Taylor, a strict constructionist. His colleague was
Wilson Cary Nicholas, who was also devoted to the principles of strict
construction. One of the South Carolina Senators v/as Pierce Butler, a
Democrat. Daniel Stone represented North Carolina, and Robert Cooke
represented Tennessee. Both were broad constructionists and members of
the Democratic-Republican Party. Colonel Pickering, a senator of Massa¬
chusetts, was a staunch supporter of broad construction and a member of
the Democratic Party, Georgia was represented by Abraham Baldwin and
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James Jackson, states-rights Republicans.
In the House, a small clique of states-rights Republicans controlled
legislation. Speaker Itocon was at their head; John Randolph, chairman of
the ways and means committee, was their spokesman. Joseph H. Nicholson
of Maryland, and Caesar A. Rodney of Delaware, supported Randolph on the
committee, while two of Jefferson's sons-in-law, Thomas M, Randolph and
John W. Eppes, sat in the Virginia delegation.
Both in the Senate and the House the Southern Republicans of the
Virginia school held supremacy. In the Senate they controlled twenty-
five votes against nine; in the House, one-hundred and two against
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thirty-nine,
^^^Adams, History, I, 96.
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The debate began first in the House of Representatives. On Octo¬
ber 22, 1803, it was reported to the House that the conventions entered
into with the government of France for the cession of Louisiana to the
United States had been ratified by the Senate and were laid before the
House in its legislative capacity. John Randolph submitted a resolu¬
tion providing for the carrying of the treaty and conventions into ef¬
fect. This was submitted to a committee to which the President's mes-
sage (October 21, 1803) had been referred. Two days later, October
24, Gaylord Griswold of New York moved a resolution asking that the
President be requested to have laid before the House a copy of the treaty
between France and Spain, entered into October 1, 1800, together with a
copy of the deed of cession of Louisiana from Spain to France under the
treaty, if such deed existed} also any other documents in possession of
the American Government showing that the United States had really ac-
IIR
quired title to the possession of Louisiana. The first part of the
resolution, that concerning the treaty between France and Spain, was
taken up and carried by the casting vote of the Speaker. The other part
of Griswold's motion was lost by a close vote of fifty-nine to fifty-
seven. Nicholson, Rodney and many other outstanding Republicans voted
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with the Federalists.
The President was able to comply with the request made by the House
for a copy of the Franco-Spanish treaty. Fortunately, a copy of the
treaty - the Treaty of San Ildefonso - had been sent to Jefferson by




riufus King, the United States Minister in London, in
On October 25, the House considered measures for carrying the treaty
into effect, and the constitutional issue was raised at once. Gaylord
Griswold desired to know the source of the constitutional power of the
Government to incorporate the territory with its inhabitants into the
Union of the United States, with the privileges of the United States.
The constitutional right of making treaties, he said, was vested in the
President and Senate and a treaty made by them on a subject constitu¬
tionally within their treaty-making power was valid without the consent
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of the House, Even though the framers of the Constitution had looked
forward to a greater population, thought Griswold, they had not intended
that an addition of territory large enough to overbalance all the rest
should be made. He did not believe that any such power had been delegated
to any department of the Government. If it had been placed anywhere, it
must rest with the legislature, for the Constitution states that new
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states are to be admitted into the Union by Congress, Thinking further,
Griswold believed that in promising to admit Louisiana as a state into
the Union, the treaty assumed for the President power which in any case
could not have been his. Also, the treaty gave to French and Spanish
ships special privileges for twelve years in the port of New Orleans;
while the Constitution forbade any preference to be given, by any regu¬
















John Randolph answered Griswold by stating clearly the treaty-making
powers, as he interpreted themi
If the Government of the United States possesses
the constitutional power to acquire territory from
foreign states, the Executive, as the organ by which
we communicate with such states, must be the prime
agent in negotiating such an acquisition. .
Thus Gaylord Griswold's first objection was answered. Griswold objected
in the second place that the treaty made New Orleans a favored port. "I
regard this stipulation,” replied Randolph, "as a part of the price of
the territory. It was a condition vdiich the party ceding had a right to
acquire, and to which we had a right to assent. The right to acquire in-
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volved the right to give the equivalent demanded.
After the subject had been treated by speakers of less weight, Roger
Griswold of Connecticut spoke. He was not altogether satisfied with the
interpretation here given. TOiile declaring that the power of making
treaties belonged exclusively to the President, with the consent of the
Senate, and that a treaty, constitutionally made and ratified, became a
law and must be executed, he still maintained that the treaty must be
consistent with the Constitution in every respect.
Nicholson took it upon himself to answer the charge that the Presi¬
dent and Senate have no right to pledge the Government for anything not
immediately within their own powers. He pointed out that the President
%
and Senate have the treaty-making power but that nearly all of the trea¬
ties ratified by them contain stipulations which must be performed by
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the House, if performed at all.
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When Nicholson sat down, Caesar Rodney took the floor. He began by
appealing to the "general welfare" clause. "I cannot perceive," said he,
"why within the fair meaning of this general provision is not included
the power of increasing our territory, if necessary for the general wel¬
fare or common defense." He next referred to the "necessary and proper"
clause. "Have we not also vested in us every power necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or
in any department or officer thereof?"^^®
One more point was affirmed by Rodney. Gaylord Griswold had main¬
tained that the territory mentioned in the Constitution was the territory
existing in 1789. Rodney disagreed. Congress, he said, had express power
to "make all needful rules and regulations" respecting any and all terri¬
tory; it had no need to infer this power from other grants. As for the
special privileges of trade accorded to New Orleans, this violated the
Constitution in no way; it was indirectly a benefit to all the states,
129
and a preference to none.
Griswold only affirmed that the people of the states had never dele¬
gated to John Randolph or Thomas Jefferson, or to a majority of the Uni¬
ted States Senate, the right to make a political revolution by annexing
a foreign state. Jefferson agreed with Griswold that they had not; if
]29A
they had, "then we have no Constitution," was his comment*
The Northern Democrats also supported these views; but the opinions
of the Northern Democrats on constitutional questions carried little
weight. Neither among them nor among Southern Republicans did any member
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question what Randolph, Nicholson, and Rodney had said.^^*^
House speaker Macon sat silently in his chair while John Randolph
131closed the debate. Not a voice was raised in the administration party
against Randolph's views. After one day's debate, ninety Republicans sup-
132
ported Randolph with their votes and twenty-five alone voted against.
The resolution which was agreed upon reads:
Resolved: That provision ought to be made for carrying
into effect the treaty and conventions concluded at Paris
on the thirtieth of April, 1803, between the United States
of America and the French Republic.
On October 27, the House began a discussion on a bill from the Senate
enabling the President to take possession of the ceded territory and empow
ering him to use the army and navy, if necessary, and also use so much of
the sum appropriated as might be necessary. The bill was not allowed to
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pass without opposition on constitutional grounds. For instance, the
real objection to the passage of the bill was voiced by Randolph who de¬
clared himself opposed to "too extensive a power in the Executive." An¬
other member of the House strongly opposed to the bill was Roger Griswold.
He argued that "the transfer to the President of all powers being exercised
in the territory would be making him legislator, judge and executive, some-
thing which could not be done constitutionally.
Nicholson defended the constitutionality of the bill. The President,
according to his interpretation, was merely invested with the appointment
of persons to exercise the civil, military and judicial powers of the ex¬
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The bill was passed October 28, 1803, by a vote of eighty-nine to
twenty-three. The Senate voted twenty-six to five in favor of the bill
and it was approved by the President October 31, Below is the billj
An Act Enabling the President to Take Possession of
Louisiana t
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa¬
tives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled,
that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby
authorized to take possession and occupy the territory ceded
by France to the United States by the treaty concluded at
Paris, on the thirtieth day of April last, between the two
nations^ and that he may for that purpose, and in order to
maintain in the said territories the authority of the United
States, employ any part of the army and navy of the United





On November 2, 1803, the Senate took up the subjects of the right
of the Government under the Constitution to acquire new territory and
the status of the acquired territory. After several speeches had been
made without touching deeply the constitutional difficulty. Senator Pick¬
ering of Massachusetts took the floor. He affirmed the right of conquest
or of purchase., and the right to govern the territory so acquired as a
dependent province; but neither the President nor Congress couM incor¬
porate this territory into the Union, nor could the incorporation law-
fully be effected even by an ordinary amendment to the Constitution,
He stated further:
I believe the assent of each individual state to be
necessary for the admission of a foreign country or an
associate in the Union: in like manner as in a commer¬
cial house, the consent of each member would be neces¬
sary to admit a new partner into the company. I believe
^^^Clarence E, Carter (ed.). Territorial Papers of the United States
(Washington, 1940), XI, 52.
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that this whole transaction, has been purposely wrapped
in obscurity by the French Government. The boundary
of Louisiana, for instance, on the side of Florida is,
in the treaty, really unintelligible; and yet nothing
was more easy to define, . ,137
Pickering was followed by Dayton of New Jersey, and he by John Tay¬
lor from Virginia, Taylor argued that, in purchasing Louisiana, the Uni¬
ted States Government had bought a foreign people without their consent
and without consulting the States, and had pledged itself to incorporate
this people in the Union, Taylor's argument, however, supported the
act. On the right to acquire territory, he took the ground which was
taken by Joseph Nicholson in the House, He inferred it from the war
and treaty powers, "If the means of acquiring and the right of holding
are equivalent to the right of acquiring territory, then this right
merged from the separate states to the United States, as indispensably
1 TO
annexed to the treaty-making povrer and the power of making war,”
Must Louisiana be governed extra-constitutionally by "inherent
powers," as Griswold maintained; or should Congress ask for new and
expressed authority from the States? Taylor took the first position.
The treaty-making power, he said, was not denied; it was competent to
acquire territory. This territory by the acquisition became a part of
the Union, a portion of the territories of the United States and might
139
be "disposed of" by Congress without an amendment to the Constitution,
Taylor differed with Jefferson on this point. His interpretation was
not acceptable to the opponents of the treaty,
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His opposition to the purchase was grounded on a party reason. He argued
that the relative strength which this admission gives to Southern and Wes
tern interests is contradictory to the principles of our original Union.
The President and the Senate had no power to make states, and the treaty
140
was void.
Tracy's speech was answered by Breckinridge of Kentucky. He point¬
ed out that by Tracy's construction, "territories and citizens are con¬
sidered held as the property of the United States, and may consequently
be used as dangerous engines in the hands of the Government against the
States and people.He argued that the admission by treaty of a
foreign state was less dangerous and therefore more constitutional than
such ownership of foreign territory.
Breckinridge's speech was followed by a speech made by John Q. Adams
Adams believed that the treaty was outside of the Constitution and he
urged the Senate to accept this view.
Senator Wilson Cary Uicholas, speaking next, thought that the treaty¬
making power was \mdefined, but not unlimited; the general limitations
of the Constitution applied to it, not the special limitations of power,
and the treaty must be judged by its conformity with the general meaning
of the compact. He then explained the difficulties in the case:
If the third article of the treaty is an engagement to
incorporate the Territory of Louisiana into the Union of
the United States, and to make it a State, it caimot be
considered as an unconstitutional exercise of the treaty¬
making power; for it will not be asserted that the terri-
tory is incorporated as a State by the treaty itself. ...
What the third article of the treaty provided was that;
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The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be in¬
corporated in the Union of the United States, and admit¬
ted as soon as possible, according to the principles of
the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of the rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United
States; and in the meantime, they shall be maintained
and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and the religion 'vdiich they profess
This article caused the principal struggle over constitutional in¬
terpretation aroused by the treaty. Wiether the treaty-making power
could guarantee such rights as were here laid down was questioned by op¬
ponents of the treaty. John Taylor denied that the treaty-making power
could guarantee such rights stated in the articlej
It is conceded that the treaty-making power cannot,-
by treaty, erect a new State. ... The United States
possesses territory, comprised in the Union of territory,
and not in the union of States. Congress is empowered to
regulate or dispose of State sections of the Union. The
citizens of these territorial sections are citizens of
the United States, and they have all the rights of citi¬
zens of the United States; but such rights do not include
those political rights arising from State compacts or gov¬
ernments. . • ,144
John Randolph argued that a stipulation to incorporate the ceded
territory did not imply that the inhabitants must ever be admitted to the
enjoyment of the privileges of citizenship. It did not mean that they
must be brought into the Union on an equal footing with the people of the
original states, or of those states created under the Constitution. It
merely extended to them the rights and immunities of citizens*
, , , .being those rights and immunities of jury-trial,
liberty of conscience, etc., which every citizen may
challenge, whether he be a citizen of an individual
State, or of a territory subordinate to and dependent on
those States in their corporate capacity. In the mean¬
time they are to be protected in the enjoyment of their
existing rights. There is no stipulation, however, that
^^^American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 541,
^^^Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 1st. sess., 50-52.
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they shall ever be formed into one or more States.
The debate in the Senate was closed by Senator Cocke of Tennessee
who challenged the objections made to the treaty. He contended that
the treaty-making powers were "competent to the full and free exercise
of their best judgment in making treaties, without limitation of power;
for, on every subject in indiich that power is called to act, it must act,
on its own responsibility." According to Cocke’s interpretation, then,
the treaty-making power passes out of the hands of the people by their
consent, and, for a time limited by them, is vested in the President
146
and Senate*
Without further discussion, the vote on the passage of the bill to
create eleven million, two hundred and fifty thousand dollars of stock
to pay for Louisiana, was carried in the Senate by a majority of twenty-
six on November 10, 1803. Those opposing the bill were Hillhouse and
Tracy of Connecticut, Pickering of Massachusetts and White and Wells of
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Delaware.
The outcome of the debate in both houses of Congress was victory
for the Jeffersonian Republicans. Their contention in general was that
though no express power was given, certain provisions of the Constitution
afforded justification for the acquisition of territory. These were the
power given to Congress to declare war, and the treaty-making power of
the President and Senate. Although the New England Federalists fought
vigorously against such a complete shift in the balance of sectional







teoting the interest of the future growth of the nation.
Jefferson*s Plan for the Government of the Acquired Territory. Be¬
fore ratification of the treaty, Jefferson had taken it for granted that
the treaty would be ratified and provision made for the transfer of the
territory to the United States. As early as July 18, 1803, only four
days after the arrival of the treaty from France, he wrote to Governor
William Claiborne of the Mississippi Territory that the government, pub¬
lic property and archives of Louisiana were to be delivered up irnmediate-
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ly after the exchange of ratifications. Claiborne replied that he
would hold himself in readiness to embark for New Orleans immediately on
receiving orders. Claiborae was to receive the territory and hold it un¬
til Congress made other arrangements.
Jefferson already had a good man in mind to be governor of Louisiana,
so he informed liladison July 31. "Sumter," he regarded, "as perfect in all
points as we can expect, sound judgment, standing in society, knowledge of
the world, wealth, liberality, familiarity with the French language and
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having a French wife." Thomas Sumter ("Sumpter") was a Revolutionary
Yfar hero, and at the date of Jefferson's letter. United States Senator
from South Carolina.
It had been Jefferson's idea that the upper portion of the territory
should be closed to settlers. John Breckinridge of Kentucky, however, in¬
formed Jefferson that it would be impossible to prevent the Americans from
crossing the Mississippi, "as they can do so with equal ease in every part
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reached the same conclusion as Breckinridge, for in reply to Breckin¬
ridge's letter, he declared that after the filling up of the eastern side
of the Mississippi, range after range of states would be laid off on the
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western side.
An outline of what Jefferson considered proper for the government of
the Louisiana territory was submitted to Gallatin in a letter, November
9, 1803, in which he said*
The administration of Justice to be prompt. Perhaps
the judges should be obliged to hold their courts weekly, at
least for some time to come. The ships of resident owners to
be naturalized, and in general the laws of the United States
respecting navigation, importation, exportation, etc.,to be
extended to the ports of the ceded territory.
The hospitals to be provided for.
Slaves not to be imported. . .
... I believe it best to appoint a governor and three
judges, with legislative powers;. . . the new legislature
will introduce the trial by jury in criminal cases, first;
the habeas corpus,.the freedom of the press, freedom of re¬
ligion, etc., as soon as can be, ...
Jefferson was planning a form of government in vhich the people to be
governed were to have no voice whatever. Congress had complete power to
regulate their rights and privileges as it saw fit. It was a practical
plan of government, but it was contrary to Jefferson's usual principles
of government.
Jefferson kept busy gathering material from many sources in order
that Congress might be supplied with all information that might be of
assistance in the framing of a form of government for Louisiana. The re¬
sult was a state paper which he submitted to Congress November 14, 1803,
covering a wide range of topics, such as boimdaries, population, resources.
Jefferson to Breckinridge, September IE, 1803, Washington, (ed.),
op. pit., IV, 542.
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©xisting system of government, expcj^ts end imports, and many other
things.
Writing.to Dewitt Clinton, December 2, 1803, Jefferson said that
much difference of opinion manifested itself as to the manner of govern¬
ing Louisiana. He added that, "although it is as yet incapable of self-
government as children, yet some cannot bring themselves to suspend its
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principles for a single moment."
On January 17, 1804, Jefferson wrote to Governor McKean of Penn¬
sylvania s
We are now at work on a territorial division and
government for Louisiana, It will probably be a small
improvement of our former territorial governments, or
first grade of government. The act proposes to give
them an assembly of Notables, selected by the Governor
from the principal characters of the territory. This
will, I think, be a better legislature than the former
territorial one and will not be a greater departure
from sound principle,
Discussion of the government in the Senate began November 28, 1803,
when it was moved that a committee be appointed to form a government for
the territory. This motion was taken into consideration December 5, and
Senators Breckinridge of Kentucky, Wright of Maryland, Jackson and Bald-
win of Georgia and Adams of Massachusetts were selected,The commit¬
tee, through Breckinridge, reported on December 30, the bill which bears
Breckinridge's name. After discussions in both houses of Congress, the
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bill was finally passed. According to the provisions of the bill,
the purchased territory was to be divided into two parts, that north of
^^^American State Papers, Miscellaneous, I, 344-356,
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the thirty-third parallel to be called the "District of Louisiana,"
connected, for purposes of government, with the territory of Indiana.
The name "Territory of Orleans," was applied to the southern area. For
this region the bill provided for a governor appointed by the President
for a term of three years; a secretary, similarly appointed for four
years; and a legislative council of thirteen members, appointed annual¬
ly by the President. The governor was given power to convene and ad¬
journ the council at will. The judicial officers were to be appointed
by the President for a term of four years. The right of trial by jury
was granted in capital cases, in criminal prosecutions, and in all cases
criminal and civil, in the superior court, if either party required it.
The slave trade in the territory was restricted to slaves brought from
States of the Union by American citizens going there to settle, and who
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at the time were bona fide owners of such slaves. The bill was ap-
proved by Jefferson, March 26, 1804,
The Importance of the Purchase of Louisiana. It is hard to overes¬
timate the importance of the Louisiana Purchase. It was one of the most
momentous events in the history of idle United States,
France sold Louisiana to the United States for approximately
$15,000,000. The addition of 750,961,280 acres of land to the public do
main at a cost of 3.6 cents per acre was one of the greatest bargains
ever made. It secured to the United States the greatest and richest val
ley of land in the world iidiioh, vdien filled with a free population,
would guarantee the perpetuation of American democracy throughout the





In his third annual message, asking Congress to pay for the region,
Jefferson dwelt upon the value of the Mississippi Eiver as an outlet
for the products of the Western States; upon the importance of unre¬
stricted navigation of the river "free from collisions with foreign
powers and danger to our peace," and upon the extent and fertility of
161the country as an "ample provision for our posterity," Jefferson
saw clearly that the rich valley of land had permanent value. The
treaty of 1803 gave official encouragement to the process ty which Am¬
ericans, unsatisfied in their quest for more land, carried American au¬
thority to the shores of the Pacific Ocean,
160. ,Adams, History, II, 49,
161
Jefferson, quoted in Richardson, (ed,), op, cit,, I, 346,
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APPENDIX A
Treaty of Purchase Between the United States and the French Republics*
The President of the United States of America, and the First Consul
of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, desiring to re¬
move all sources of misunderstanding relative to objects of discussion
mentioned in the second and fiftlj articles of the Convention of (the
8th VendSmiaire;, an 9, ) September 30, 1800, relative to the rights
claimed by the United States, in virtue of the Treaty concluded at Ma¬
drid, the 27th October, 1795, between His Catholic Majesty and the said
United States, and willing to strengthen the union and friendship, which
at the time of the said Convention was happily re-established between the
two nations, have respectively named their Plenipotentiaries, to wit:
The President of the United States of America, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate of the said States, Robert R. Livingston,
Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, and James Monroe, Minister
Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the said States, near the Gov¬
ernment of the French Republic; and the First Consul, in the name of the
French people, the French citizen Barbe-Marbois, Minister of the Public
Treasury, who, after having respectively exchanged their full powers,
have agreed to the following articles:
ART. 1. T/ifhereas, by the article the third of the Treaty concluded
at St, Ildefonso, (the 9th Vendemiaire, an 9,) October 1, 1800, between
the First Consul of the French Republic and His Catholic Majesty, it was
agreed as follows: His Catholic Majesty promises and engages on his part
*Annala_nf
, 1802-1803, pp. 1006-1008.
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to cede to the French Republic, six months after the full and entire exe¬
cution of the conditions and stipulations herein, relative to his Royal
Highness the Duke of Parma, the Colony or Province of Louisiana, with the
same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when
France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subse¬
quently entered into between Spain and other Statest And whereas, in pur¬
suance of the Treaty, particularly of the third article, the French Re¬
public has an incontestable title to the domain and to the possession of
the said territory, the First Consul of the French Republic, desiring to
give to the United States a strong proof of friendship, doth hereby cede
to the said United States, in the name of the French Republic, for ever
and in full sovereignty, the said territory, with all its rights and ap¬
purtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they might have been ac¬
quired by the French Republic, in value of the above-mentioned treaty, con¬
cluded with His Catholic Majesty.
ART. 2. In the cession made by the preceding article, are included the
adjacent islands belonging to Louisiana, all public lots and squares, va¬
cant lands, and all public buildings, fortifications, barracks, and other
edifices, which Eire not private property. The archives, papers, and docu¬
ments, relative to the domain and sovereignty of Louisiana and its depen¬
dencies, will be left in the possession of the Commissaries of the United
States, and copies will be afterwards given in due form to the magistrates
and municipal officers, of such of the said papers and documents as may be
necessary to them.
ART. 3. The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated
in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, ac¬
cording to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment
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of all the righto, advantages, and immunities, of citizens of the United
States; and, in the mean time, they shall be maintained and protected in
the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which
they profess.
ART. 4, There shall be sent by the Government of France a Commis¬
sary to Louisiana, to the end that he do every act necessary, as well to
receive from the officers of His Catholic Majesty the said country and
its dependencies in the name of the French Republic, if it has not been
already done, as to transmit it, in the name of the French Republic, to
the Commissary or agent of the United States.
ART. 5. Immediately after the ratification of the present treaty by
the President of the United States, and in case that of the First Consul
shall have been previously obtained, the Commissary of the French Republic
shall remit all the military posts of New Orleeuis, and other parts of the
ceded territory, to the Commissary or Commissaries named by the President
to take possession; the troops, whether of France or Spain, who may be
there, shall cease to occupy any military post from the time of taking
possession, and shall be embarked as soon as possible in the course of
three months after the ratification of this treaty.
ART, 6. The United States promise to execute such treaties and ar¬
ticles as may have been agreed between Spain and the tribes and nations
of Indians, until, by mutual consent of the United States and the said
tribes or nations, other suitable articles shall have been agreed upon,
ART. 7. As it is reciprocally advantageous to the commerce of
France ariH the United States, to encourage the conmmnication of both na¬
tions, for a limited time, in the country ceded by the present treaty,
until general arrangements relative to the commerce of both nations may
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be agreed on, it has been agreed between the contracting parties, that the
French ships coming directly from France or any of her Colonies, loaded
only with the produce or manufactures of France or her said Colonies, and
the ships of Spain coming directly from Spain or any of her Colonies,
loaded only with the produce or msmufactures of Spain or her Colonies,
shall be admitted during the space of twelve years in the port of New Or¬
leans, and in all other legal ports of entry within the ceded territory,
in the same meinner as the ships of the United States coming directly from
France or Spain, or any of their Colonies without being subject to any
other or greater duty on the merchandise, or other or greater tonnage
than those paid by the citizens of the United States.
During the space of time above-mentioned, no other nation shall have
a right to the same privileges in the ports of the ceded territory. The
twelve years shall commence three months after the exchange of ratifica¬
tions, if it shall take place in France, or three months after it shall
have been notified at Paris to the French Government, if it shall take
place in the United States; it is, however, well understood, that the ob¬
ject of the above article is to favor the manufactures, commerce, freight,
nnri navigation of France and Spain, so far as relates to the importations
that the French and Spanish shall make into the said ports of the United
States, without in any sort affecting the regulations that the United
States may make concerning the exportation of the produce and merchandise
of the United States, or any right they may have to make such regulations,
ART, 8, In future and forever, after the expiration of the twelve
years, the ships of France shall be treated upon the footing of the most
favored nations in the ports above-mentioned,
ART. 9, The particular convention signed this day by the respective
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Ministers, having for its object to provide the payment of debts due to
the citizens of the United States by the French Republic, prior to the
30th of September, 1800, (Sth Vendemiaire, an 9,) is approved, and to
have its execution in the same manner as if it had been inserted in the
present treaty; and it shall be ratified in the same form and in the
same time, so that Lthe one shall not be ratified distinct from the other.
Another particular convention, signed at the same date as the present
treaty, relative to a definitive rule between the contracting parties
is, in the like manner, approved, and will be ratified in the same form
and in the same time, and jointly.
ART. 10. The present treaty shall be ratified in good and due form,
and the ratification shall be exchanged in the space of six months after
the date of the signature of the Ministers Plenipotentiary, or sooner if
possible.
In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed these
articles in the French and English languages, declaring, nevertheless,
that the present treaty was originally agreed to in the French language,
and have thereunto put their seals.
Done at Paris, the 10th day of Floreal, in the 11th year of the






The sources used in this study are classified under two main head¬
ings, primary and secondary. The principal primary sources are printed
in the Annals of Congress, XI and XII, appendix; American State Papers,
Foreign Relations. II, and Public I^ands. I. They contain the diplomatic
correspondence of the Louisiana cession to the United States, and papers
of the cession as submitted to Congress by Jefferson during the debate
on the ratification of the treaty with France,
The most convenient storehouse for the messages of the President is
J. D. Richardson, (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, I,
H, A. Washington, (ed,). The Writings of Jefferson, IV, VIII, con¬
taining material from the manuscript Jefferson Papers, and A, Koch and
W, Peden, (ed.). The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, are
the two most valuable editions of Jefferson’s printed writings,
A valuable work in which to find the specific terms of the treaties
concerned is Himter Mller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the
United States of America, II,
Of the sources under the secondary heading, an excellent story of
the Louisiana Purchase is told in Henry Adams, The History of the United
States during the Administration of Thomas Jefferson, I. This work con¬
tains meuiy extracts from the manuscript Jefferson Papers, Thus the work
has the two-fold aspect of a collection of sources and of a secondary au¬
thority.
Other useful special studies relating to the Louisiana Purchase are
A, P, VHiitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803, especially valuable
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in developing the attitude of the West; E. W, Lyon, Louisiana in French
Diplomacy, 1759"1804, includes findings earlier published in article
form; Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, I, II, is an account
of the exploration and settlement of the United States from the Alleghan-
ies to the Pacific; and Elizah W. Lyon, The Man Who Sold Louisiana, is a
full-length biography of BarbS-Marbois.
The most helpful brief accounts of the Louisiana Purchase are C, E.
Hill, "James Madison," in Samuel F. Bemis, ed.. The American Secretaries
of State and Their Diplomacy, I, and Edward Channing, History of the Uni¬
ted States, Chapter XI.
E. S. Brown, The Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase,
is an excellent history of the constitutional problems arising out of the
Louisiana Purchase. Manuscript material has been used. It was very use¬
ful in developing Chapter V. A brief account of the debate in Congress
on the treaty is given in Carl B. Swisher, American Constitutional Devel¬
opment, Chapter VII.
Jefferson's relations with France, including the Purchase of Louisi¬
ana, are treated in considerable detail in A. B. Darling, Our Rising Em¬
pire, 1765-1805, Chapters XV and XIX.
There are several biographies relating to all or part of Jefferson's
varied career. Of these, the biographies by J. T. Adams, The Living Jef-
ferson, and David Muzzey, Thomas Jefferson, are favorable to him and seem
to be authentic. Marie Kimball, The Road to Glory, 1745-1776, gives an
interesting story of Jefferson's early life. Some of the minor works on
Jefferson's life are articles by L. F. Abbott, "Thomas Jefferson," Outlook,
CLXII (May 26, 1926), 131-142; and Carl Becker, "Thomas Jefferson," En¬
cyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Ist.^d. vol. VIII.
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Two resourceful articles on the story of Jefferson and the Louisiana
Purchase are H. A. Bruce, ''Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase,"
Outlook, LXXXVIII (February, 1908), 433-46; and W.,E, Hemphill, "Jeffer¬
son's Background of the Louisiana Purchase," Mississippi Valley Histori¬
cal Review, XXII (September, 1935), 127-150.
Roy Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, The Public Domain, 1776-1936, is
an excellent account of the land systems and land speculations in Ameri¬
can history. It contains an interesting discussion on the importance of
the Louisiana Purchase#
Attached are the primary and secondary lists of sources arranged in
alphabetical order. The sub-divisions of the primary list are docximents
and compilations; those of the secondary list are biographies, special




American State Papers, Foreign Relations. Vol. II. Washington: Gales
and Seaton, 1834.
American State Papers, Miscellaneous. Vol. I. Washington: Gales and
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Annals of Congress. 8 Congress,! Session (1803-1804). Washington:
Gales and Seaton, 1852.
Carter, Clarence E. (ed.). Territorial Papers of the United States.
Vol. XI. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940. A
record of documents pertaining to territories of the United
States.
Dimbar, Rovdand (ed.). Official Letter Books of William Charles C. Clai¬
borne, 1801-1816. Vol. I. Jackson: State Department of Ar¬
chives and History, 1917. A work consisting of six volumes
which contains Governor Claiborne's reports of the territorial
government of Louisiana, from 1803-to 1812,
Miller, Hunter. Treaties and Other International Acts of the United
States of America. Vol. 2. Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1931.
Compilations
Adams, Henry (ed,). The Writings of Albert Gallatin, Vol. I. Philadel¬
phia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1879.
Hunt, Gaillard (ed,). The Writings of James Madison. Vol. VII. New
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Koch, A. and Peden, W. (ed,). The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas
Jefferson. New York: Random House, Inc., 1944,
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